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Abstract
In the problem of swarm computing, n agents wish to securely and distributively perform a
computation on common inputs, in such a way that even if the entire memory contents of some of
them are exposed, no information is revealed about the state of the computation. Recently, Dolev,
Garay, Gilboa and Kolesnikov [ICS 2011] considered this problem in the setting of information-
theoretic security, showing how to perform such computations on input streams of unbounded
length. The cost of their solution, however, is exponential in the size of the Finite State Automaton
(FSA) computing the function.
In this work we are interested in efficient computation in the above model, at the expense of
minimal additional assumptions. Relying on the existence of one-way functions, we show how to
process a priori unbounded inputs (but of course, polynomial in the security parameter) at a cost
linear in m, the number of FSA states. In particular, our algorithms achieve the following:
In the case of (n, n)-reconstruction (i.e. in which all n agents participate in reconstruction of
the distributed computation) and at most n − 1 agents are corrupted, the agent storage, the
time required to process each input symbol and the time complexity for reconstruction are all
O(mn).
In the case of (t+1, n)-reconstruction (where only t+1 agents take part in the reconstruction)
and at most t agents are corrupted, the agents’ storage and time required to process each input
symbol are O(m
(
n−1
t−1
)
). The complexity of reconstruction is O(m(t+ 1)).
∗This research has been supported by the Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Institute for Future
Defense Technologies Research named for the Medvedi, Shwartzman and Gensler Families, the Israel Internet Association
(ISOC-IL), the Lynne and William Frankel Center for Computer Science at Ben-Gurion University, Rita Altura Trust Chair
in Computer Science, Israel Science Foundation (grant number 428/11), Cabarnit Cyber Security MAGNET Consortium,
MAFAT and Deutsche Telekom Labs at BGU. Emails: dolev,yuditsky@cs.bgu.ac.il, garay@research.
att.com, niv.gilboa@gmail.com, kolesnikov@research.bell-labs.com. A brief announcement will
be presented in DISC 2012.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
8.
49
09
v1
  [
cs
.D
C]
  2
4 A
ug
 20
12
1 Introduction
Distributed computing has become an integral part of a variety of systems, including cloud computing
and “swarm” computing, where n agents perform a computation on common inputs. In these emerg-
ing computing paradigms, security (i.e., privacy and correctness) of the computation is of a primary
concern. Indeed, in swarm computing, often considered in military contexts (e.g., unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) operation), security of the data and program state is of paramount importance; simi-
larly, one persistent challenge in the field of cloud computing is ensuring the privacy of users’ data,
demanded by government, commercial, and even individual cloud users.
In this work, we revisit the notion of never-ending private distributed computation, first considered
by Dolev, Garay, Gilboa and Kolesnikov [7]. In such a computation, an unbounded sequence of
commands (or inputs) are interpreted by several machines (agents) in a way that no information about
the inputs as well as the state of the computation is revealed to an adversary who is able to “corrupt”
the agents and examine their internal state, as long as up to a predetermined threshold of the machines
are corrupted.
Dolev et al. were able to provide very strong (unconditional, or information-theoretic) security
for computations performed by a finite-state machine (FSA), at the price however of the computation
being efficient only for a small set of functions, as in general the complexity of the computation is
exponential in the size (number of states) of the FSA computing the function.
In this work, we minimally1 weaken the original model by additionally assuming the existence
of one-way functions (and hence consider polynomial-time adversaries—in the security parameter;
more details below), and in return achieve very high efficiency as a function of the size of the FSA.
We stress that we still consider computation on a priori unbounded number of inputs, and where the
online (input-processing) phase incurs no communication. We now describe the model in more detail.
The setting. As in [7], we consider a distributed computation setting in which a party, whom we
refer to as the dealer, has a finite state automaton (FSA) A which accepts an (a priori unbounded)
stream of inputs x1, x2, . . . received from an external source. The dealer delegates the computation
to agents A1, . . . , An, by furnishing them with an implementation of A. The agents receive, in a
synchronized manner, all the inputs for A during the online input-processing phase, where no com-
munication whatsoever is allowed. Finally, given a signal from the dealer, the agents terminate the
execution, submit their internal state to the dealer, who computes the state of A and returns it as
output.
We consider an attack model where an entitiy, called the adversary, Adv, is able to adaptively
“corrupt” agents (i.e., inspect their internal state) during the online execution phase, up to a threshold2
t < n. We do not aim at maintaining the privacy of the automaton A; however, we wish to protect
the secrecy of the state of A and the inputs’ history. We note that Adv may have external informa-
tion about the computation, such as partial inputs or length of the input sequence, state information,
etc. This auxiliary information, together with the knowledge of A, may exclude the protection of
certain configurations, or even fully determine A’s state. We stress that this cannot be avoided in any
implementation, and we do not consider this an insecurity. Thus, our goal is to prevent the leakage
or derivation by Adv of any knowledge from seeing the execution traces which Adv did not already
possess.
1Indeed, the existence of one-way functions is considered a minimal assumption in contemporary cryptography. In
particular, we do not allow the use of public-key cryptography.
2We note that more general access structures may be naturally employed with our constructions.
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As mentioned above, our constructions relying on one-way functions dictates that the computa-
tional power of entities (adversary, agents), be polynomially bounded (in κ, the security parameter).
Similarly, our protocols run on input streams of polynomial length. At the same time, we do not
impose an a priori bound on its length; moreover, the size of the agents’ state is independent of it.
This allows to use agents of the same (small) complexity (storage and computational power) in all
situations.
Our contributions. Our work is the first significant extension of the work of [7]. Towards our
goal of making never-ending and private distributed computation practical, we introduce an additional
(minimal) assumption of existence of one-way functions (and hence pseudo-random number genera-
tors [PRGs]), and propose the following constructions:
A scheme with (n, n) reconstruction (where all n agents participate in reconstruction), where
the storage and processing time per input symbol is O(mn) for each agent. The reconstruction
complexity is O(mn).
A scheme with (t + 1, n) reconstruction (where t corrupted agents do not take part in the recon-
struction), where the above costs are O(m
(
n−1
t−1
)
).3
Regarding tools and techniques, the carefully orchestrated use of PRGs and secret-sharing tech-
niques [15] allows our protocols to hide the state of the computation against an adaptive adversary
by using share re-randomization. Typically, in the context of secret sharing, this is simply done by the
addition of a suitable (i.e., passing through the origin) random polynomial. However, due to the no-
communication requirement, share re-randomization is a lot more challenging in our setting. This is
particularly so in the more general case of the (t+1, n)-reconstruction protocol. We achieve share re-
randomization by sharing PRG seeds among the players in a manner which allows players to achieve
sufficient synchronization of their randomness, which is resilient to t corruptions.
Related work. Reflecting a well-known phenomenon in distributed computing, where a single point
of failure needs to be avoided, a team of agents (e.g., UAVs) that collaborate in a mission is more
robust than a single agent trying to complete a mission by itself (e.g., [1, 3]). Several techniques
have been suggested for this purpose; another related line of work is that of automaton splitting and
replication, yielding designs that can tolerate faults and as well as provide some form of privacy of the
computation (see, e.g., [5–9]). As mentioned above, only [7] addresses the unbounded-input-stream
scenario.
Recall that in secure multi-party computation [2, 4, 11], n parties, some of which might be cor-
rupted, are to compute an n-ary (public) function on their inputs, in such a way that no information is
revealed about them beyond what is revealed by the function’s output. At a high level, we similarly
aim in our context to ensure the correctness and privacy of the distributed computation. However,
as explained in [7], our setting is significantly different from that of MPC, and MPC definitions and
solutions cannot be directly applied here. The reason is two-fold: MPC protects players individual
inputs, whereas in our setting the inputs are common to all player. Secondly, and more importantly,
MPC operates on inputs of fixed length, which would require an a priori estimate on the maximum
input size smax and agents’ storage linear in smax. While unbounded inputs could be processed, by
for example processing them “in blocks,” this would require communication during the online phase,
which is not allowed in our setting. Refer to [7] for a more detailed discussion on the unbounded
inputs setting vis-a`-vis MPC’s.
3For some values of t, e.g. t = n
2
, this quantity would be exponential in n. This does not contradict our assumption on
the computational power of the participants; it simply means that, given κ, for some values of n and t this protocol cannot
be executed in the allowed time.
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Finally, we note that using recently proposed fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) [10] (and
follow-ups) trivially solves the problem we pose, as under FHE the agents can simply compute arbi-
trary functions. In fact, plain additively homomorphic encryption (e.g., [13]) can be used to encrypt
the current state of the FSA and non-interactively update it as computation progresses, in a manner
similar to what is described in our constructions (see the high-level intuition in Section 3). We note
that, firstly, public-key encryption and, dramatically so, FHE, suffer from orders-of-magnitude com-
putational overhead, as compared to the symmetric-key operations that we rely on. More importantly,
in this work we aim at minimizing the assumptions needed for efficient unbounded private distributed
computation.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present in more detail the model, definitions and building blocks that we use throughout the paper.
We dedicate Section 3 to a high-level description of our constructions, while in Section 4 we present
them in detail. The full privacy analysis is presented in Section 5.
2 Model and Definitions
A finite-state automaton (FSA) A has a finite set of states ST , a finite alphabet Σ, and a transition
function µ : ST × Σ −→ ST . In this work we do not assume an initial state or a terminal state for
the automaton, i.e., it may begin its execution from any state and does not necessarily stop.
We already described in the previous section the distributed computation setting—dealer, agents,
adversary, and unbounded input stream—under which the FSA is to be executed. In more detail, we
assume a global clock to which all agents are synchronized. We will assume that no more than one
input symbol arrives during any clock tick. By input stream, we mean a sequence of input symbols
arriving at a certain schedule of clock ticks. Abusing notation, we will sometimes refer to the input
without explicit reference to the schedule. (We note that the global clock requirement can in principle
be removed if we allow the input schedule to be leaked to Adv.)
We also mentioned that Adv is allowed to corrupt agents as the execution of the protocol pro-
ceeds. We consider the so-called passive or semi-honest adversary model, where corrupted agents can
combine their views in order to learn protected information, but are not allowed to deviate from the
protocol. Furthermore, each agent can be corrupted only once during an execution. When it does,
Adv can view the entire contents of a corrupted agent’s memory, but does not obtain any of the global
inputs.
Incidentally, we consider event processing by an agent as an atomic operation. That is, agents
cannot be corrupted during an execution of state update. This is a natural and easily achievable
assumption, which allows us to not worry about some tedious details. The computation is then con-
sidered to be secure, if any two executions (possibly on different inputs and initial states—defined
more formally below) are “similarly” distributed.
This model of security for distributed computation on unbounded input streams was introduced by
Dolev et al. [7] as the progressive corruption model (PCM), allowing Adv to be computationally un-
bounded, and in particular requiring that the distributions of the two executions (again, more formally
defined below) be identical.
In this work we use a variant of PCM, applying the following two weakenings to the PCM defini-
tion:
1. Rather than requiring that the distributions of executions be identical, we require them to be com-
putationally indistinguishable. This means that we guarantee security only against polynomial-
time-bounded adversaries.
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2. We require indistinguishability of executions for the same corruption timeline (and, of course,
different input streams). This means that, for example, agent IDs are now allowed to be included
in the agents’ views. (We use agent IDs in one of our contructions.) We stress that this is not a
significant security weakening, as essentially we only allow the adversary to differentiate among
the agents’ identities; the inputs and current state of the computation remain computationally
hidden.
We now present our amended PCM definition. We first formalize the notion of corruption timeline
and the view of the adversary.
Definition 1. A corruption timeline ρ is a sequence ρ = ((A1, τ1), . . . , (Ak, τk)), where A1, . . . , Ak
are the corrupted agents and τ1, . . . , τk (τ1 ≤ . . . ≤ τk) denote the time when the corresponding
corruption took place. The length of a corruption timeline is |ρ| = k.
We denote by VIEWΠρ (X, s) the probability distribution of the aggregated internal states of cor-
rupted agents at the time of corruption, when executed on input X and initial state s.
Definition 2 (Computational Privacy in the Progressive Corruption Model). We say that a dis-
tributed computation scheme Π is t-private in the Progressive Corruption Model (PCM) if for every
two states s1, s2 ∈ ST , polynomial-length input streams X1, X2, and any corruption timeline ρ,
|ρ| ≤ t,
VIEWΠρ (X1, s1)
c≈ VIEWΠρ (X2, s2).
Here, ‘
c≈’ denotes the computational indistinguishability of two distributions.
2.1 Tools and Building Blocks
A pseudo-random generator (PRG) G : X → Y , where X and Y are typically of the form {0, 1}k
and {0, 1}k+l, respectively, for some positive integers k, l. Recall that PRGs are known to exist based
on the existence of one-way functions, and that the security property of a PRG guarantees that it is
computationally infeasible to distinguish its output on a value chosen uniformly at random from X
from a value chosen uniformly at random from Y (see, e.g., [12]). In our setting, we will further
assume that the old values of the PRG seeds are securely erased by the agents upon use and hence are
not included in the view of the adversary.
The other basic tool that our protocols make use of is secret sharing [15], where essentially, a
secret piece of information is “split” into shares and handed out to a set of players by a distinguished
player called the dealer, in such a way that up to a threshold t < n of the players pulling together
their shares are not able to learn anything about it, while t + 1 are able to reconstruct the secret. We
present the specific instantiations of secret sharing as needed in the corresponding sections.
3 Overview of Our Approach
Let A be a publicly known automaton with m states. We assume that we have some ordering of the
states of A, which are denoted by corresponding labels. Every agent stores the description of the
automaton. In addition, during the computation, for every state sj of A, every agent Ai computes
and stores its current label `ij . As mentioned above, all agents receive a global input stream Γ =
γ1, γ2, ...γi, ... and perform computation in synchronized time steps.
At a high level, the main idea behind our constructions is that the state labels will be shares (a` la
secret sharing [15]) of a secret which identifies the currently active state of A. More specifically, for
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each of the m automaton states, the n state labels (held by the n agents) will be shares of a 1 if the
state is currently active, and shares of a 0 otherwise. We will show how the players’ local computation
on their shares will ensure that this property is maintained throughout the computation on the entire
input stream Γ. When the input stream Γ is fully processed (or a stop signal is issued), the agents
recover the current state by reconstructing the secrets corresponding to each automaton state. At the
same time, shares of the secrets (when not taken all together) reveal no information on the current
state of A.
We now present additional high-level details on two variants of the approach above. Recall that we
consider the semi-honest adversary model, where corrupted players are not allowed to deviate from
the protocol, but combine their views in order to learn protected information.
(n, n)-reconstruction. In this scenario, we require that all n agents participate in the reconstruction
of the secret (corrupted players are considered semi-honest and hence honestly provide their computed
shares).
At the onset of computation, the shares are initialized using an (n, n) additive secret-sharing
scheme, such that the initial state labels are the sharing of 1, and labels of each of the other states are
shares of 0. When processing a global input symbol γ, each agent computes a new label for a state
s by summing the previous labels of all states s′ such that µ(s′, γ) = s. It is easy to see that, due
to the fact that we use additive secret sharing, the newly computed shares will maintain the desired
secret-sharing property. Indeed, say that on input symbol γ, u states transition into state s. If all of
them were inactive and their labels were shares of 0’s, then the newly computed shares will encode
a 0 (as the sum of u zeros). Similarly, if one of the u predecessor states was active and and its label
shared a 1, then the new active state s will also correspond to a share a 1.
A technical problem arises in the case of “empty” states, i.e., those that do not have incoming
transitions for symbol γ, and hence their labels are undefined. Indeed, to hide the state of the automa-
ton from the adversary who corrupts agent(s), we need to ensure that each label is a random share
of the appropriate secret. Hence, we need to generate a random 0-share for each empty state without
communication among the agents.
In the (n, n) sharing and reconstruction scenario, we will non-interactively generate these labels
pseudo-randomly as follows. Each pair of agents (Ai, Aj) will be assigned a random PRG seed seed ij
Then, at each event (e.g., processing input symbol γ), each agent Ai will pseudo-randomly generate a
string rj using each of the seeds seed ij , and set the label of the empty state to be the sum of all strings
rj . This is done for each empty state independently. The PRG seeds are then (deterministically)
“evolved” thereby erasing from the agent’s view the knowledge of the labels’ provenance, and making
them all indistinguishable from random. As all agents are synchronized with respect to the input and
the shared seeds, it is easy to see that the shares generated this way reconstruct a 0, since each string
rj will be included twice in the total sum, and hence will cancel out (we will use an appropriate [e.g.,
XOR-based] secret-sharing scheme such that this is ensured.).
Finally, and intuitively, we observe that PCM security will hold since the view of each corrupted
agent only includes pseudo-randomly generated labels for each state and the current PRG seed value.
As noted above, even when combined with the views of other corrupted players, the labels are still
indistinguishable from random.
(t + 1, n)-reconstruction. In this scenario, up to t corrupted agents do not take part in the recon-
struction (this is motivated by the possibility of agents (UAVs) being captured or destroyed by the
adversary). Agents who submit their inputs are doing so correctly. Thus, here we require n > 2t.
We will take our (n, n)-reconstruction solution as the basis, and adapt and expand it as follows.
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First, in order to enable reconstruction with t+ 1 agents, we will use (t+ 1, n) additive secret-sharing
(such as Shamir’s [15]). Second, as before, we will use a PRG to generate labels, but now we will
have a separate seed for each subset of agents of size n− t+ 1. Then, at each event (e.g., processing
of an input symbol), each agent Ai, for each of the groups he belongs to, will update its shares by
generating a random (t + 1, n)-secret sharing of a 0 using the randomness generated by applying G
to the group’s seed. Then, agent Ai will use the share thus generated for the i-th agent as its own, and
set the label of the empty state to be the sum of all such shares.
Here we note that, since agents are excluded from some of the groups, and that in this scenario
up to t agents might not return their state during reconstruction, special care must be taken in the
generation of the re-randomizing polynomials so that all agents have invariantly consistent shares,
even for groups they do not belong to, and that any set of agents of size t+1 enable the reconstruction
of the secrets. (See Section 4.2 for details.) The above is done for each empty state independently. As
before, the PRG seeds are then (deterministically) evolved, making them all indistinguishable from
random.
Algorithm 1: Template algorithm for agent Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for label and state update.
Input: An input symbol γ.
Output: New labels for every state.
1: if γ is initialized then
2: `ij :=
∑
k,µ(sk,γ)=sj
`ik (the sum is calculated over some field F, depending on the scheme).
3: end if
4: for every T ∈ T s.t. Ai ∈ T do
5: Compute BTST ← G(seedTr ), where BT = bT1 bT2 ...bTm, and bTj ∈ F, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
6: seedTr+1 := S
T .
7: for j = 1 to m do
8: `ij := `
i
j +Rj , where Rj is a scheme-specific pseudo-random quantity.
9: end for
10: end for
Remark 3.1. This approach reveals the length and schedule of the input Γ processed by the players.
Indeed, the stored seeds (or more precisely, their evolution which is traceable by the adversary simply
by corrupting at different times players who share a seed) do reveal to the adversary the number of
times the update function has been invoked. We hide this information by by requiring the agents to
run updates at each clock tick.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the update operations performed by agent Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) during the
r-th clock cycle. The key point is the generation of Rj , the label re-randomizing quantity. Notice also
that in every clock cycle, there may or may not be an input symbol received by the agent; if the agent
did not receive any input, we assume that the input symbol is not initialized.
4 The Constructions in Detail
4.1 The (n, n)-reconstruction protocol
We start our formalization of the intuition presented above with the case where all n out of the n
agents participate in the state reconstruction. The protocol for this case, which we call Π(n,n), is
presented below.
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Protocol Π(n,n). The protocol consists of three phases:
Initialization. The dealer secret-shares among the agents a secret value for each state, such that the
value for the initial state is 1 and for all the other states is 0. This is done as follows. Agent Ai
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is given a a random binary string xi1xi2...xim, with the constraints that
x1init + x
2
init + ...+ x
n
init ≡ 1 mod 2,
where init is the index of the initial state of the computation, and for every 1 ≤ j 6= init ≤ m,
x1j + x
2
j + ...+ x
n
j ≡ 0 mod 2.
Each agent then proceeds to assign its state labels as `ij ← xij .
Event Processing. Each agent runs Algorithm 1, updating its labels and computing the new seeds for
the PRG. Let T be the set of all possible agents’ pairs. For line 8 of Algorithm 1, each agent Ai now
computes
Rj =
∑
T∈T ,Ai∈T
(bTj )r.
s1 s2
s3
α
α
α
α
β β
β
β
s4
(`i1)r−1 (`
i
2)r−1
(`i3)r−1
(`i4)r−1
Figure 1: The internal state of agent Ai before a transition.
Reconstruction. All agents submit their internal states to the dealer, who reconstructs the secrets
corresponding to each state, by adding (mod 2) the shares of each state, and determines and outputs
the currently active state (the one whose reconstructed secret is 1).
Before proving the correctness and privacy achieved by the protocol, we illustrate the operation
of the online (Event Processing) phase with the following example; refer to Figures 1 and 2. The
two figures describe the execution of the protocol on an automaton with four states and two possible
inputs. Figure 1 presents the internal state of agent Ai after the (r − 1)-th clock cycle. The agent
holds the original automaton and has a label for each of the four states, (`i1)r−1, (`i2)r−1, (`i3)r−1 and
(`i4)r−1.
Figure 2 shows the changes in the agent’s internal state compared to Figure 1 after the r-th clock
cycle. We also assume that in this clock cycle the agents receive an input symbol α. The new labels
for each state are the sum of old labels and pseudo-random values. The labels in the sum are the old
labels of all the states that transition to the current state given the input. Thus, the new (`i2)r includes
a sum of the old (`i2)r−1 and the old (`i4)r−1, while the new (`i3)r doesn’t include any labels in its sum
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s1 s2
s3
α
α
α
α
β β
β
β
s4
(`i1)r =
(`i2)r =
(`i3)r =
(`i1)r =
=
∑
T,i∈T (b
T
1 )r+p
= (`i2)r−1 + (`
i
4)r−1+
=
∑
T,i∈T (b
T
3 )r+p
= (`i1)r−1 + (`
i
3)r−1+
+
∑
T,i∈T (b
T
2 )r+p
+
∑
T,i∈T (b
T
4 )r+p
Figure 2: The internal state of agent Ai after an α transition.
because there is no state that transitions to s3 after an α input. The pseudo-random addition to each
state j = 1, . . . , 4 is the sum
∑
T,i∈T (b
T
j )r.
We start by proving the correctness of the construction.
Proposition 4.1. At every Event Processing step of protocolΠ(n,n)’s, the secret corresponding to the
current state in the computation is 1 and for all other states the secret is 0.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of steps r that the automaton performs, i.e., the
number of clock cycles.
For the base case, if we consider the state of the protocol after the initialization step and before
the first clock cycle, i.e., at r = 0, then the statement is true by our definition of the label assignments.
Let us first consider the case where at the r-th step an input symbol γr from Γ is received. Following
the protocol, agent Ai’s new label for state j becomes
`ij ←−
∑
k :
µ(sk,γr)=sj
`ik +
∑
Ai∈T
(bTj )r.
Consider now the next state of the computation in the automaton; we wish to show that the secret
corresponding to that state will be 1. Let curr be the index of the current state of the automaton, and
next be the index corresponding to the next state; by definition, µ(scurr , γr) = snext . Then,
`inext ←−
∑
k :
µ(sk,γr)=snext
`ik =
`icurr +
∑
k 6=curr :
µ(sk,γr)=snext
`ik +
∑
i∈T
(bTj )r.
By the induction hypothesis, we know that
n∑
i=0
`icurr ≡ 1 (mod 2)
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and for k 6= curr ,
n∑
i=0
`ik ≡ 0 (mod 2).
Thus, if we will sum over all the agents:
n∑
i=0
`icurr + ∑
k 6=curr :
µ(sk,γr)=snext
`ik +
∑
i∈T
(bTj )r

=
n∑
i=0
`icurr +
∑
k 6=curr :
µ(sk,γr)=snext
n∑
i=0
`ik
+
n∑
i=0
∑
i∈T
(bTj )r ≡ 1 + 0 ≡ 1 (mod 2).
This is because in
∑n
i=1
∑
i∈T (b
T
j )r, every (b
T
j )r appears exactly twice in this sum, once for every
element in T . Using similar arguments one can see that all the other states will resolve to 0.
In the case that in the r-th step no input symbol is received, due to the fact that we just add the
random strings in the same way as in the case above, we again get that the secret corresponding to the
current state of the computation is 1, and for all others is 0.
Proposition 4.2. Protocol Π(n,n) is (n− 1)-private in the PCM model according to Definition 2.
Proof sketch. Recall that the underlying observation is that when a corruption takes place (which
cannot happen during the label-update procedure), the agent’s state includes the current labels and
PRG seeds which have already been evolved, and hence cannot be correlated with the label shares
previously generated.
Without loss of generality, consider the case where Adv corrupts all but one agent according
to an arbitrary corruption timeline, and assume, say, agent A1 is not corrupted. We argue that the
view of the adversary is indistinguishable from a view corresponding to (randomly) initialized agents
A2, ..., An on the given automaton and any initial state. In other words, the view of the adversary is
indistinguishable from the view he would obtain if he corrupted the agents simultaneously and before
any input was processed. Once we prove that, the proposition follows.
The view of each corrupted agent includes n−1 seeds that he shares with other agents and the FSA
labels which are secret shares of 0 or a 1. We argue that, from the point of view of the adversary, these
labels are random shares of either 0 or 1. This follows from the PRG property that an evolved seed
cannot be correlated with a prior output of the PRG, and from the fact that A1 remains uncorrupted.
Indeed, the newly generated “empty” states’ labels look random since the adversary cannot link them
to the PRG seeds in his view. The other states’ labels look random to the adversary since they are
XORed with A1’s label.
Thus, the total view of the adversary consists of random shares of 0 and 1, and is hence indistin-
guishable from the one corresponding to the initial state.
We now calculate time and storage complexity of Π(n,n). At every step of the computation, each
agent pseudo-randomly generates and XORs n−1 strings. Further, each agent holds a small constant-
length label for each automaton state, and n− 1 PRG seeds, yielding an O(m+ n) memory require-
ment.
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4.2 The (t+ 1, n)-reconstruction protocol
Recall that in this case, up to t of the agents might not take part in the reconstruction, and thus n > 2t.
A straightforward (albeit costly) solution to this scenario would be to execute Π(n,n) independently
for every subset of agents of size t+ 1. This would involve each agent Ai holding
(
n−1
t
)
copies of the
automaton A, one copy for each such subset which includes Ai, and updating them all, as in Π(n,n),
according to the same input symbol. Now, during the reconstruction, the dealer can recover the output
from any subset of t + 1 agents. The cost of this approach would be as follows. Every agent holds(
n−1
t
)
automata (one for every t+1 tuple that includes this agent), and executes Π(n,n), which requires
O(m + t) memory, resulting in a total cost of O
((
n−1
t
) · (m + t)), with the cost of computation per
input symbol being proportional to storage’s.
We now present Π(t+1,n), an improved (t + 1, n) reconstruction scheme, whose intuition was
already presented in Section 3. The protocol uses Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme [15], which we
now briefly review. Let F be a field of size greater than n, and s ∈ F be the secret. The dealer
randomly generates coefficients c1, c2, ..., ct from F and construct the following polynomial of degree
t, f(x) = s + c1x + c2x2 + ... + ctxt. The dealer gives each participant Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the value
f(i). It can be easily seen that one can reconstruct the secret from any subset of at least t+ 1 points,
and no information about the secret is revealed by t points (or less).
Protocol Π(t+1,n). As before, the protocol consists of three phases:
Initialization. Using Shamir’s secret sharing as described above, the dealer shares a secret 1 for the
initial state and 0 for all other states. In addition, the dealer generates a random seed for every set of
n− (t− 1) = n− t+ 1 agents, and gives each agent the seeds for the sets it belongs to. Let T be the
set of all possible subsets of n− t+ 1 agents.
Event Processing. Each agent runs Algorithm 1 updating its labels, as follows.
Let T ∈ T and j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, be a state of the automaton. Upon obtaining value bTj (refer
to Algorithm 1), the agents in T (individually) construct a degree-t polynomial, P Tj , by defining its
value on the following t + 1 field points: 0, all the points i such that Ai 6∈ T , and k such that k is
the minimal agent’s index in T (the choice of which point in T is arbitrary). Now define P Tj (0) = 0,
P Tj (i) = 0 ∀Ai 6∈ T , and P Tj (k) = bTj .
Observe that by this definition, every agent Ai ∈ T can use polynomial interpolation to compute
P Tj (i), since the only required information is b
T
j (and the knowledge of set membership).
Let polynomial Pj be defined as Pj =
∑
T∈T P
T
j . Each agent Ai now computes Pj(i) (note that
this is possible since the values corresponding to sets the agent does not belong to is set to 0), and
updates the j-th label, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, in Algorithm 1 by setting Rj = Pj(i) in line 8.
Reconstruction. At least t + 1 agents submit their internal state to the dealer, who, for every j =
1, . . . ,m, views the j-th labels of t + 1 agents as shares in a Shamir secret-sharing scheme. The
dealer reconstructs all the m secrets using the scheme’s reconstruction procedure, and determines and
outputs the currently active state (whose recovered secret is equal to 1).
Proposition 4.3. At every Event Processing step of protocol Π(t+1,n), the shared secret for the current
state in the computation is 1 and for all the other (inactive) states, the shared secret is 0. Furthermore,
t+ 1 agents can jointly reconstruct all secrets.
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the number of clock cycles r. We show that at each
clock cycle r, for every state sj , the n labels `1j , . . . , `
n
j are points on a degree t polynomial Qj whose
free coefficient is 1 if j is the current state and 0 otherwise.
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At initialization, the claim is true by our definition of the label assignments.
Assume that the induction hypothesis is correct after r − 1. We prove the hypothesis for the r-th
step. Assume first that in this step the agents receive an input letter γr, and denote the current state by
scurr . By our definition, the new label of the state j of agent i is
`ij ←−
∑
k :
µ(sk,γr)=sj
`ik + Pj(i),
or, equivalently,
`ij ←−
∑
k :
µ(sk,γr)=sj
Qk(i) + Pj(i).
For every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, define polynomial Q′j as
Q′j =
∑
k :
µ(sk,γr)=sj
Qk + Pj .
Therefore, Q′j(i) = `
i
j for every j and every i. In addition, since every Qk is of degree t and so is Pj ,
we deduce thatQ′j is also of degree t. We finish proving the induction step by showing thatQ
′
j(0) = 1
only for the correct state.
Let µ(scurr , γr) = snext . By induction, Qcurr(0) = 1 and Qj(0) = 0 for any j 6= curr .
Furthermore, by construction Pj(0) = 0, and therefore Q′curr(0) = 1. Since Qj(0) = 0 for any
j 6= curr , we have that Q′j(0) = 0 for any j 6= next .
If the agents do not receive any input symbol in the r-th clock cycle, then the claim follows by
similar arguments as above.
Proposition 4.4. Π(t+1,n) is t-private in the PCM model according to Definition 2.
At a high level, the proof follows the steps of the proof of Proposition 4.2. The full details of the
privacy analysis are presented in Section 5.
We now calculate the costs incurred by the protocol. The space complexity of each agent is as
follows. An agent holds a label for every state, i.e. m · (dlog|F|e + 1) bits. Additionally every
agent holds
(
n−1
n−t
)
=
(
n−1
t−1
)
seeds, where every seed is of size len . Thus, in total we have
(
n−1
t−1
) ·
len + m · (dlog|F|e + 1) bits. Each step of the Event Processing phase requires O(m(n−1t−1)) time
for seed manipulation and field operations. Reconstruction (by the dealer) is just interpolation of m
polynomials of degree t.
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Supplementary Material:
5 Privacy Analysis in Detail
We show that each of our schemes in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 is computationally private in the PCM in
two stages. In the first stage we construct for each scheme Π and every possible corruption timeline
ρ an intermediate scheme, I(Π, ρ). We prove that if the corruption timeline is ρ then the view of an
adversary in I(Π, ρ) is independent of the state of the automaton. In other words, the adversary’s view
is distributed identically for any initial state and any sequence of input symbols.
In the second stage we prove that the view of an adversary in Π with any efficiently constructible
corruption timeline ρ and any efficiently constructible input stream is computationally indistinguish-
able from the adversary’s view in I(Π, ρ). We deduce that Π is computationally private in the PCM.
5.1 Constructing I(Π, ρ)
Notation 1. Let Π(n,n) denote the scheme of Section 4 that requires all the agents for reconstruction,
and let Π(t+1,n)naive and Π
(t+1,n) denote the threshold schemes of Section 4.2. We say that an adversary
is appropriate for the scheme Π(n,n) if it corrupts at most n − 1 agents. We say that an adversary is
appropriate for the Π(t+1,n)naive and Π
(t+1,n) if schemes it corrupts at most t agents.
Let Π be one of the schemes Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive or Π
(t+1,n). Π defines initial data that an agent A
stores: a description of the automaton, a label for each node in the automaton and random seeds that
are shared with other agents. For each scheme the domain of seeds is {0, 1}len while the domain of
labels is a field F. For example, in Π(n,n) the field is F = GF(2). The subsets of agents that share a
single seed are specific to each scheme. The description of I(Π, ρ) follows.
Initialization: An agentAi is initialized with a description of the automaton as in Π. For every subset
of agents T such that Ai ∈ T , if the agents in T share a seed in Π that other agents do not have then
Ai is initialized with m + 1 elements, seedT0 , R
T
1 , . . . , R
T
m. seed
T
0 is chosen uniformly at random
from {0, 1}len, while RT1 , . . . , RTm are chosen uniformly at random and independently from F. Ai
computes the initial label of the j-th state (indexed from 1 to m) over F as
`ij =
∑
T,A∈T
αTRTj ,
for fixed coefficients αT ∈ F− {0}.
The agent stores seedT0 but R
T
1 ,. . .,R
T
0 are deleted.
Processing: Each of the schemes Π defines data processing for every clock cycle. This processing
includes computing new values for each seed and new values for each node label.
Computing new labels and seeds in I(Π, ρ) depends on the corruption timeline ρ, which is defined
by a sequence ρ = ((A1, τ1), . . . , (At, τt)) such that the adversary corrupts agent Ai at time τi for
i = 1, . . . , t and τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ . . . ≤ τt.
An agent A in I(Π, ρ) begins updating seedT0 only after the corruption of the first agent Ai that
holds seedT0 . Therefore, at any time τ , τ ≤ τi, we have that seedTτ = seedT0 . If τ ≥ τi + 1 the agent
modifies seedTτ as Π specifies for updating a seed.
An agent Ai in I(Π, ρ) begins updating a state label `ij only after Ai is corrupted at time τi.
Therefore, when the adversary corrupts Ai it obtains the original label `ij . For every clock cycle after
τi the agent modifies `ij as Π specifies for updating a label.
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5.2 Privacy of I(Π, ρ)
We show that if the corruption timeline is fixed to ρ then I(Π, ρ) is private in the information-theoretic
sense. In order to do so, we introduce the following definition and lemma.
Definition 3. Let A be a set of agents, let H = (A, E) be a hypergraph and let F be a finite field. We
call H a distribution hypergraph, if for every T ∈ E , there is an element RT chosen uniformly from
F, such that every A ∈ T holds RT and every A /∈ T has no information on RT .
Lemma 5.1. Let A be a set of agents and let H = (A, E) be a distribution hypergraph over a
finite field F. Assume that each agent Ai uses a fixed set of public elements {αT }Ai∈T , such that
∀T, αT ∈ F− {0}, to compute a label
`i =
∑
T,Ai∈T
αTRT .
Assume that an adversary that corrupts an agent Aj obtains both the agent’s label `j and its random
strings RT for all T such that Aj ∈ T and its . Then, the label of any uncorrupted agent Ai is
distributed independently of the adversary’s view if and only if for any subset of agents K that the
adversary corrupts and for any agent Ai, Ai 6∈ K, there exists a hyper-edge T ∈ E , such that Ai ∈ T
and T ∩K = ∅.
Proof. Let Ai be an agent such that Ai 6∈ K and there exists a hyper-edge T ∈ E , such that Ai ∈ T
and T∩K = ∅. SinceRT is chosen uniformly at random from F, which is a field, and αT 6= 0 we have
that `i =
∑
T,Ai∈T α
TRT is distributed uniformly at random in F and furthemore `i is independent
of the adversary’s view.
Conversely, assume that there exists an agent Ai 6∈ K such that for every T,Ai ∈ T , there exists
an agent A, A 6= Ai, such that A ∈ K ∩ T . Then, the adversary obtains RT for every T such that
Ai ∈ T and can therefore compute `i without corrupting Ai.
Proposition 5.2. For each of the three possible schemes Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive ,Π
(t+1,n) and every corrup-
tion timeline ρ, if the adversary is appropriate for the scheme Π (Π ∈ {Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive ,Π(t+1,n)})
then I(Π, ρ) is private in the following sense. For every two states s1, s2 ∈ ST and for any two input
streams X1, X2 ∈ Γ∗, VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ (X1, s1) = VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ (X2, s2). Furthermore, all the state labels
are random and independent elements in a finite field F.
Proof. The view of an adversary I(Π, ρ) is made up of the description of the automaton, the seeds
and the labels. All of these are obtained from an agent at the moment of corruption. The description
of the automaton is static. The distribution of the seeds depends only on ρ and as a consequence is
independent of the initial state s and the input stream X .
Therefore, the only data elements in the adversary’s view that could depend on the initial state and
the input stream are the state labels.
However, just prior to the adversary corrupting an agent A, since the adversary is appropriate
there is a subset of uncorrupted agents T such that A ∈ T and all agents in T share a seed that is
not known to any agent outside T . In I(Π(n,n), ρ), an appropriate adversary corrupts a total of at
most n − 1 agents and just prior to corrupting an agent there are at least two uncorrupted agents.
By the definition of Π(n,n) this pair of agents, which we denote by T , shares a seed. Therefore, by
the definition of I(Π(n,n), ρ) the two agents share the elements seedT0 , R
T
1 , . . . , R
T
m, which are all
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random and independent of the adversary’s view. Such subsets T of uncorrupted agents also exist in
I(Π
(t+1,n)
naive , ρ) and I(Π
(t+1,n), ρ).
By the construction of I(Π(n,n), ρ), before the corruption ofA, the state labels ofAi have their ini-
tial value `ij =
∑
T,A∈T α
TRTj and therefore, by Lemma 5.1 these labels are random and independent
of the adversary’s view.
Therefore, the adversary’s view in I(Πi, ρ) with corruption timeline ρ is distributed identically for
any initial state s and any input stream X .
5.3 Computational Privacy of Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive and Π(t+1,n)
We complete the analysis by proving that Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive and Π
(t+1,n) are computationally private in
the PCM.
Notation 2. Let κ be a security parameter, let F be a field and let q(κ) be a polynomial. Letm, t, n and
len be parameters such that t2
(
n−1
t−1
)
(m |F| + len) < q(κ) and let G : {0, 1}len −→ {0, 1}m|F|+len
be a pseudo-random generator. Denote the uniform distribution on {0, 1}m|F|+len by U .
We regard VIEWΠρ (X, s) as a random variable that represents the whole view of the adversary
in Π and regard VIEWΠρ[τ ](X, s) as a reduction of that view to the first τ clock cycles. Similarly,
VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ[τ ] (X, s) represents the adversary’s view of the first τ clock cycles in I(Π, ρ).
Notation 3. Let Π be one of the schemes Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive or Π
(t+1,n). For every τ = 0, . . . , q(κ)
define Hτ to be a hybrid scheme which is identical to I(Π, ρ) for any clock cycle τ ′ such that τ ′ ≤ τ
and is identical to Π for any clock cycle τ ′′ such that τ ′′ > τ . Define a sequence of random variables
Y0, Y1, . . . , Yq(κ) as follows. Select an arbitrary initial state s, select an input stream X from Γq(κ)
and select a corruption timeline ρ = ((A1, τ1), . . . , (At, τt)) from ρq(κ). Yτ is the view of an adversary
for the scheme Hτ given the choices of s, X and ρ.
It follows from the definition of the schemes H0, . . . ,Hq(κ) that H0 is Π and Hq(κ) is I(Π, ρ).
Therefore, Y0 = VIEWΠρ (X, s) and Yq(κ) = VIEW
I(Π,ρ)
ρ (X, s).
Note that Hτ is well defined for any τ since the memory contents and the inputs of Π and I(Π, ρ)
are all in the same domain (although the distribution of the memory contents is not identical). The
only difference between Π and I(Π, ρ) is the processing at each clock cycle.
Proposition 5.3. Let Π be one of the schemes Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive or Π
(t+1,n). If the adversary is ap-
propriate for Π then VIEWΠρ (X, s)
c≡ VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ (X, s) for any initial state s, any efficiently con-
structible corruption timeline ρ ∈ ρq(κ) and any efficiently constructible input stream X ∈ Γq(κ).
Proof. We assume towards a contradiction that the views of an adversary in Π and in I(Π, ρ) are not
computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, there exist a probabilistic, polynomial time algorithm
D and a polynomial p(·) such that ∣∣DΠ −DI(Π,ρ)∣∣− 1p(κ) ,
for an infinite number of values κ. DΠ denotes Pr[D(VIEWΠρ (X, s)) = 1] and DI(Π,ρ) denotes
Pr[D(VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ (X, s)) = 1].
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We construct an algorithm D¯ that distinguishes between t2
(
n−1
t−1
)
independent samples of U and
t2
(
n−1
t−1
)
independent samples of G(seed) for a random seed ∈ {0, 1}len. Since t2(n−1t−1) is at most
a polynomial in κ, the algorithm D¯ contradicts the assumption that G is a pseudo-random generator,
thus proving the proposition. Denote the distribution on t2
(
n−1
t−1
)
independent samples of U by Ulong
and denote the distribution on t2
(
n−1
t−1
)
independent samples of G(seed) by Glong.
Description of D¯: the algorithm receives as input a description of the automaton, κ, n and t. In
addition, the algorithm receives as input a binary string z of length t2
(
n−1
t−1
)
(m |F|+ len) and decides
whether it is chosen from Ulong or Glong by performing the following steps.
1. Choose a random initial state s, select an input stream X from Γq(κ) and select a corruption
timeline ρ = ((A1, τ1), . . . , (At, τt)) from ρq(κ).
2. Choose a random τ in the range 1, 2, . . . , q(κ).
3. Simulate the operation of the agents A1, . . . , At in the scheme I(Π, ρ) for the first τ − 1 clock
cycles.
4. In the τ -th clock cycle all the agents that have already been corrupted, i.e. in cycles 1 to τ − 1,
execute Π (which is identical to I(Π, ρ) for a corrupted agent). For any uncorrupted player,
including those that are corrupted in the τ -th cycle do the following:
(a) Update any seed that is shared with a corrupted player as specified by Π (which is identical
to the update process of I(Π, ρ) for such seeds).
(b) For any seed that is shared by set of uncorrupted agents T , select a fresh string of length
m |F| + len from z and parse it as BT ||ST for ST ∈ {0, 1}len and BT = bT1 , . . . , bTm.
Replace the previous seed with ST .
(c) Recall that in every Π the label of the j-th state, j = 1, . . . ,m, is updated by a linear
combination of previous state labels and of elements bTj derived from expanded seeds.
D¯ updates the label in a similar way, except that for every T such that ST is shared by
uncorrupted agents, bTj is selected from z as described in the previous step instead of being
selected from an expanded seed.
5. Simulate the operation of the agents A1, . . . , At in the scheme Π for the last q(κ) − τ clock
cycles.
6. Throughout the simulation of the agents simulate the actions of an adversary with corruption
timeline ρ.
7. Run D on the adversary’s view and return the result of D.
We argue that if z is chosen from Ulong then the view of the adversary that D¯ simulates is Yτ ,
while if z is chosen from Glong then the view of that adversary is Yτ−1. Obviously, the view that the
adversary obtains in the first τ − 1 clock cycles is identical to the view in I(Π, ρ) and the view in the
last q(κ) − τ clock cycles is identical to the view in Π. Therefore, we need to prove that the view in
the τ -th clock cycle is identical to I(Π, ρ) if z is uniformly random and identical to Π if z is selected
from Glong.
I(Π, ρ) specifies identical processing to Π for corrupted agents and seeds shared by corrupted
agents. Therefore, the differences are in seeds that are shared only by uncorrupted agents and in state
labels of uncorrupted agents.
15
In the τ -th clock cycle, D¯ replaces seeds that are shared by uncorrupted agents with strings se-
lected from z. If z is uniformly random then these seeds are uniformly random. Therefore, in this case
the distribution of the seeds is identical to the distribution if I(Π, ρ) is executed in the previous clock
cycle, τ − 1. If z is a sequence of elements of the form G(seed), where seed is random, then the new
seed, ST is exactly as specified by Π after a single clock tick. That is the expected distribution if the
agents run Π in the previous clock tick, τ − 1.
The state labels are updated by a linear combination in which the coefficients of each bTj are non-
zero. If z is uniformly random then each bTj is a random field element in F and therefore each state
label is a a random field element in F. By Proposition 5.2 that is identical to the distribution of state
lables in I(Π, ρ). If z is a sequence of elements of the form G(s), where s is random, then the new
label is exactly as specified by Π after a single clock tick.
The argument above shows that once τ is given, D¯ distinguishes between a sequence of uni-
form elements and a sequence of pseudo-random elements with the same probability that D distin-
guishes between Yτ and Yτ−1. Since τ is chosen randomly in the range 1, 2, . . . , q(κ) and since
Y0 = VIEWΠρ (X, s) and Yq(κ) = VIEW
I(Π,ρ)
ρ (X, s) we have that
Pr[D¯(Glong = 1)] =
1
q(κ)
q(κ)∑
τ=1
Pr[D(Yτ ) = 1],
and
Pr[D¯(Ulong) = 1] =
1
q(κ)
q(κ)∑
τ=1
Pr[D(Yτ−1) = 1].
Therefore,∣∣Pr[D¯(Glong = 1)]− Pr[D¯(Ulong) = 1]∣∣ =
1
q(κ)
∣∣Pr[D(Yq(κ)) = 1]− Pr[D(U) = 1]∣∣ >
1
q(κ) · p(κ)
for an infinite number of values κ. Since D¯ distinguishes between Ulong and Glong we deduce
that G is not a pseudo-random generator and have thus reached a contradiction.
Theorem 5.4. If the adversary is appropriate then the schemes Π(n,n),Π(t+1,n)naive and Π
(t+1,n) are all
computationally private in the PCM.
Proof. By proposition 5.3 if the adversary is appropriate then for every efficiently constructible cor-
ruption timeline ρ, ρ ∈ ρq(κ), every two initial states s1, s2 and every two efficiently constructible
input streams X1, X2, such that X1, X2 ∈ Γq(κ) we have VIEWΠρ (X1, s1)
c≡ VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ (X1, s1)
and VIEWΠρ (X2, s2)
c≡ VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ (X2, s2).
By Proposition 5.2 we know that VIEWI(Π,ρ)ρ (X1, s1) = VIEW
I(Π,ρ)
ρ (X2, s2). Therefore,
VIEWΠρ (X1, s1)
c≡ VIEWΠρ (X2, s2).
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